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This paper analyzes the competition level of the banking industry, prior to and after the introduction 
of the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API). Using panel data, the result shows that competition in banking 
decreased after the introduction of API, with a large tendency to monopoly or collusive oligopoly. For a 
bank with niche market such as a Regional Bankand joint venture bank, the introduction of API did not 
affect it much, while the competition level for a foreign bank was the lowest one. Non price variables 
would be the main determinantsof banking competition in the future including number of branches, 
wages and credit volume.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Increased competition in the Indonesian banking actually began with Indonesian banking 
transparency initiated by the issuance of a policy package on June 1, 1983 (Pakjun) with the 
aim to modernize banking. This was then proceeded with a policy package October (Pakto) on 
October 27, 1988, which provided convenience in permitting the establishment of new banks, 
including the opening of a branch office. At that time, with funds of Rp 10 billion alone, an 
investor was able to establish a new bank (Deni and Djoni, 2004), and this led to a significant 
increase in the number of banks.
An increasing number of banks in the banking sector have the potential to encourage 
businesses to be more competitive and improve the efficiency and health of banking2. But for 
Indonesian banks, mostly private banks were owned by big businessmen before the Asian crisis; 
consequently, when such businesses required substantial funding, they tended to mobilize 
public funds through their banks for business interests (of the group/groups). This meant 
that the original intent of Pakto 88 to channel public funds to the community, shifted to the 
distribution to the group so there was a potential Lending Limit violation (LLL), (Deni and Djoni, 
2004). This condition weakened the banking industry infrastructure, and consequently amidst 
the international financial market turmoil which began with the exchange rate crisis in Asian 
countries, Indonesian banks were not able to survive. These conditions resulted in the deepening 
crisis of confidence in the rupiah and national banks, especially after the revocation of business 
licenses of 16 banks in November 1997. 
The Government sought assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to resolve 
the crisis, but the policies imposed by the IMF in the form of tightening of liquidity worsened 
conditions for Indonesia3. Furthermore, the Government and the central bank tried to implement 
a comprehensive program of stabilization and reform to concurrently strengthen the national 
financial system and restore public confidence. 
In 1999, the Act No. 23 of 1999 was issued emphasizing that Bank Indonesia (BI) have 
a more focused goal of achieving and maintaining stability of the rupiah, which was seen as 
a prerequisite of economic growth sustainable. Several years later, Bank Indonesia issued the 
Indonesian Banking Architecture (API) as the basic framework of the Indonesian banking system. 
API is comprehensive and expected to provide direction, shape, and structure of the banking 
industry for a period of five to ten years (BI, 2007, the Indonesian Banking Architecture).
After the emergence of the API, which was supported by the strengthening of the capital 
structure of banks, Indonesian banks were expected to be more stable and able to function as 
intermediary institutions. Stability would result in stronger national banks that would eventually 
2 According Cetorelli (2001), there is a long view that says competition will drive banks to better market situation
3. Contrast with United State who excercised opposite policies during the global crisis of 2008.
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be able to compete with foreign banks in the international market4. The competition, which 
encourages increased competitiveness, is the main foundation of the process of strengthening 
the national banking system. Therefore, changes in the level of competition among banks will 
also change the behavior and the conduct of the banking business. 
Several studies have tried to examine competition in Indonesian banks, including Claessen 
and Laeven (2004) who estimated the level of competition in 50 countries including Indonesia 
using the Panzar-Rosse method over the period 1994-2001. From these studies it was noted 
that the Indonesian banking industry structure belonged to the category of monopolistic 
competition5. Results of this study were also supported by Setyowati (2004) whicharrived at 
the same conclusion.
Associated with the implementation of the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API), an 
interesting question arose, how the API can influence the level of stability and competition in 
Indonesian banking industry? This research question will be answered in this paper. 
The next section of this paper reviews the basic theory and literature on banking stability, 
level of competition and the performance of the Indonesian banking industry. The third part of 
the paper reviews the data and methodology employed, while the fourth section presents the 
results and analysis. The conclusion and policy implications are given at the end and comprise 
the concluding section of this paper.
 
II. THEORY
Competition is often associated with some sort of competitive situation to obtain something. 
Furthermore, competition is also often associated with market power despite the fact that 
these two things are different. Market power refers to the behavior of individual firms in setting 
pricing strategies, while the competition has more to do with the interaction of the market or 
more it aggregated members (de Rozas, 2007)
There are several forms of market competition. The first is a perfect competitive market, 
characterized by a lot of sellers and buyers, where prices are determined by market forces. 
In these market conditions, the parties are free to enter or to exit from the market. Second 
characteristic is goods are homogeneous, and the third is no transaction cost, nor transportation 
costs. On the other side, non-competitive market is characterized by the opposite features 
of perfect competition, such as monopoly and monopsony, oligopoly, and monopolistic 
competition. 
4 Associated with the number three pillars of the API.
5 Indonesian banking Hstatistic value was 0.62during the period 1994-2001 as studied by Claessen and Laeven (2004).
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2.1. Competition and Stability in the Banking Industry
Alhadeff (1951) mentioned that the banking market has several characteristics, first, the presence 
of more than one credit provider, in this case a bank, in one region. Second, the relationship 
between bankers and borrowers (debtors) are built based on the experiences related to earlier 
time lending. Third, large volumes of credit borrowers will get more offers of credit while a 
small number of borrowers will face a very limited supply. Fourth, there are barriers for the 
entry of new players who show a tendency to maintain a monopoly or oligopoly conditions 
for a positive benefit in the long run. Fifth, actions and decision of bankers generally correlate 
with each other, often referred to as agreement, mutual assistance, reduction of unhealthy 
competition, coordination, and so on. This is the reason for the existence of collusion losses 
that occur when competing against each other which can be replaced with profit obtained 
after an agreement is reached. 
Chandler (1938) argues that competition in the banking industry is not perfectly 
competitive but is coupled with monopolistic collusion to set non-price competition and price. 
Alhadeff (1951) supported the statement with Chandler stating that the bank may not be in a 
situation that it really competes because a situation of pure competition may threaten banks 
in going bankrupt which will jeopardize the macro economy as the collapse of a bank can be 
transmitted to other banks (contagion effect). 
Competition between banks can occur due to seizure of productive resources, such as the 
deposit, savings, and loans that are a source of income. Non-price competition among banks may 
take the form of gifts and promotions to attract customers as much as possible. Competition 
also may take the form of new products and the types of services that are supported by the 
development of technology that can reduce the cost of production and distribution. 
Some studies concluded that more concentrated banking markets have a low level of 
competition, which is a buffer in the face of vulnerability. This makes banks more stable. On 
the other hand, these conditions also provide incentives to excessive risk-taking. 
There are two opposing views about the relationship between a high level of banking 
competition and banking health: first the traditional view which states that banking competition 
will increase the supply of credit to companies in need. This opinion is also supported by 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) who found that high competition in the financial sector could 
boost production efficiency, quality financial products, and the level of innovation. Increased 
competition is also expected to reduce the cost of intermediation services making them more 
efficient because of the time needed to obtain a loan becomes much shorter and eventually will 
increase bank revenues (in Patti and Dell’Ariccia, 2004). In contrast, higher interest rates will 
reduce investment in research and development, so that the innovation will be hampered and 
ultimately decrease productivity (Cetorelli, 2001). Lindgren, Garcia, and Saal (1996) stated that 
a competitive banking market will use its own power to reduce weak banks and to encourage 
the existence of healthy banks. 
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Contrary to the above, there is an expressed view that competition is actually bad for a 
new company and the future of the banking industry as borrowers face credit supply when more 
and more banking competition increases. This model is based on the idea that competition will 
increase moral hazard and adverse selection problems of the borrower. When the inter-bank 
competition increases, companies increasingly have a choice of banks or creditors. Dell ’Ariccia 
(2000)6 supported the conclusion that the bank’s efforts to screen prospective borrowers will 
decline when the number of banks increase. 
2.2. Measuring Competition and Panzar Rosse Model
Based on the literature, the measurement of competition can be grouped into two: first, a more 
structural approach that is conventional and generally adheres to the paradigm of Structure 
Conduct Performance (SCP), and second, non-structural approaches that take the opposite 
direction to study of the structural approach, in which the manner or behavior of companies 
or organizations affect market conditions. There are three models of non-structural approach 
to the Iwata model, Bresnahan model, and Panzar-Rosse (PR) model. In this study, the model 
used is the PR model.
The PR model was introduced by Panzar and Rosse (PR) in 1987, using an indicator of 
competition known as ‘H statistic’ which provides a quantitative assessment of competition 
in the market. The H statisticis derived from the sum of the income elasticity of the price of 
production factors, based on reduced-form bank revenue equations. This model is widely used 
in empirical research because it does not need to specify the geographic market given the 
behavior of each bank will give you an indication of market strength. 
PR model can only be applied to companies with a single type of product. Therefore, 
the bank is treated as a loan product producer of services. In the production process, the bank 
requires three inputs namely labor, physical capital and financial account. The PR model is 
based on the assumption of a situation of perfect competition and that a company behaves 
to maximize profits. 
The data required in the model is in company unit, and does not require a level of industry 
aggregate. Another advantage is the use of bank earnings as the dependent variable which 
are more easily observed and found to be comparable in price and quantity of products or the 
actual cost. Applications of the PR model were first used to measure competition in the printing 
industry and then used for many other fields, including banking. 
TheH statistic is based on a comparative static analysis of the revenue reduction equation. 
The methodology proposed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) refers to the general equilibrium model 
of the market, where firms use different pricing strategies in response to any changes in input 
6 Paper published by Nicholson (2001): Competition among Banks: Good or Bad?
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factor prices. The price change is highly dependent on the competitive behavior of participants 
in the market. In summary, the model developed by Panzar and Rosse refers to the equilibrium 
input price (marginal cost) with gross income (gross revenue).
Following the model used Bikker and Haaf (2001)7, the optimization of the bank in the 
industry must satisfy the condition of zero profit so that revenues equal to costs. This condition 
is represented as follows: 











where Ri and Ci respectively of income and bank chargesi; y
*
i bank is in a state of equilibrium 
output; Wi is a vector of input prices; Z
R
i is a vector of exogenous variables; and Z
C
i is a vector 
of exogenous variables that affect the cost. At the company level, MR=MC, so that:
Linearization equation (2) gives the value of elasticity directly, and can avoid heteroschedasticity 
(Shaffer, 1982:                                              
In competitive equilibrium conditions (zero profit), and by some rearrangements we have:
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The reduced form revenue equation bank i, depends on the output and price of equilibrium 
as shown by:  
where the price level can be obtained from the inverse demand equation, which is in natural 
logarithm form:
(8)
where  (aggregate output in an industry). With a little algebra, the reduced form can 
be written back into:
(9)
where Zi is a vector of bank-specific variables Q. In equation (3), the statistical value of H can 
be calculated by:
(10)
H-statistic values range between to 1, which indicates the level of market competition. When 
the value of ∞− < H <0, this is the form of a market monopoly or oligopoly, perfect collusion. 
In the structure of this kind of competition, rising input prices will translate into higher 
marginal cost, the equilibrium output is reduced, and revenue declined. If 0 < H < 1, then a 
monopolistic competition market structure is formed. If a competitive market, the value of H will 
range from one (H = 1). Under these conditions, an increase in input prices will proportionally 
affect revenue changes, without distorting the optimal amount of output from the company. 
Technically, the test can be done with the value of H Wald test, as well as to examine whether 
there are differences in the value of H in the first period or a period of consolidation with the 
post-issuance API period. 
Given the PR model is a static approach, there is necessary condition that must be satisfied 
as the sample observations should represent the long-run equilibrium. Testing the stability of 
the long-term is usually done by measuring the E statistic which is the sum of the elasticity of 
Return on Equity (ROE) or Return on Assets (ROA) of the price of production factors, based on 
the reduced form income equation. The statistical value E = 0 indicates the situation in a long-
run equilibrium, which means the return of bank assets are not related to the input prices of 
factors of production. 
(11)
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The equation to test the long-run equilibrium condition can be written as follows:
(12)
and the necessary condition that indicates that the market in a long-run equilibrium is:
(13)
Fulfillment of a long-run equilibrium assumption is one of the most intractable problems in this 
method. However, some researchers emphasize that the banks had reached steady state8. 
III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Empirical Model
Estimated empirical model is a modification of the model of de Rozas (2007) in two ways, first, 
the variable logarithm of market share in loans and savings that target consumers is eliminated 
because the same group of banks makes it difficult to determine market share in a bank group. 
Second, a variable on the number of branches added is believed to consider specific variables of 
the Indonesian banking industry which could affect revenues, costs and demand9. U.S. research 
shows that banking consolidation in the country have a significant impact on improving the 
quality of banking services to customers, one of which is through the branch network (Berger, 
Demiurgic-Kunt, and Haubrich, 2004). Statistics show that the number of bank branches in 
Indonesia continues to increase despite the decline of total banks due to the large number of 
bank mergers and acquisitions among banks. 
8 Ibid.
9 Shaffer (1982) recommends using the number of branches as it can affect the cost and demand.
(14)
NITA is the income of the bank, which is the ratio between the amount of interest income and 
non-interest income to total assets. This variable includes both revenue earnings of each bank 
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and the interest, which is then divided by total assets and used as the dependent variable in 
calculating H-statistic. 
PL is wages; PLF is the price of loanable funds,and reflects price per one unit of labor 
in this study that is represented by the ratio of personnel expenses to number of employees. 
Personnel expenses used in this study are the sum of the total salary and benefits or bonuses 
plus the cost of education and training of employees. PCE is the price of capital expenditure, 
and represents the price of each unit of money in the bank that was approached by the ratio 
of interest expenses to the loanable funds comprised of deposits, tradable securities, and 
subordinated instruments. Due to data limitations, the price per one unit of the fund was 
replaced with research interest expenses compared to Third Party Funds (TPF). The third variable 
(PL, PLF, and PCE) represent the input factor prices. 
Other explanatory variables are nonfactor variables which reflect the risk of production, 
business depth, and size of the bank, as well as ability to affect revenues, costs and demand. 
EQTA is equity to total assets; LOATA is a loan to total assets, and represents the price per 
unit of capital is used. In this study the price per unit of capital is approximated by the ratio of 
capital expenditure on fixed assets. Capital expenditure in this study is obtained from the sum 
of the cost of maintenance and repairs, the cost of depreciation of fixed assets, rental fees, 
and the cost of goods and services.LFTA isthe ratio of loanable funds to total assets, proxied 
with the ratio of deposits to total assets. This variable indicates the importance of deposits in 
the balance sheet. The latter is CAB, representing the total number of branches. 
Given that thelevel of competition sought by any group of banks is examined during the 
two periods, i.e., during the consolidation phase (2001-2003), and the phase after the API was 
published (2004-2006), then equation (17) was added with a dummy variable (Dd). The dummy 
variables are specific to each type of bank (state-owned banks, foreign exchange banks, non-
foreign exchange banks, regional bank, joint venture banks, and foreign banks):
(15)
If the level of competition is in the form of monopolistic competition, then according 
to Yildirim and Philippatos (2004), there will be an increase in revenue at the time there is an 
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increase in the prices of factors of production, evenwhen this increase is not as high as the 
increase in the prices of factors of production. If the results of data processing show that the 
market is in situation of perfect competition, the relationship between revenue and the prices of 
input factors will positive. This correlation is formed are based on perfect competition in which 
the banks are in a situation of zero profit, and where free entry and free exit will drive change 
in proportion to income without disturbing the optimal output level in each company in the 
event of an increase in the prices of factors of production. If the market form is a monopoly, a 
negative correlation is expected between the income and the prices of factors of production. 
In this situation, an increase in the prices of labor and other raw materials will increase the 
marginal cost, causing equilibrium output decline to ultimately reduce bank earnings. Given 
that banks behave as companies to maximize profit and have to deal with the market price-
inelastic, then there would be a decrease in revenue. 
A positive correlation between the amount of outstanding loans and bank earnings are 
expected to occur because of the interest-bearing loans of bank revenue. Meanwhile, for the 
other variables in addition to the variable factor of production, there is no expectation of any 
kind of signs of correlation, as in other studies using the PR model10.  
The requirement that commercial banks can be tested with the dependent variable 
ROE or ROA in long-run equilibrium conditions represents the profitability of banks, with the 
following equation:
10 Bikker (2001) mentioned that the majority of researchers do not have a certain expectation of the sign of the correlation for the 
independent variables in addition to the factors of production. Most researchers still expect equity would negatively be correlated 
because they can drive revenue from interest although some other researchers actually expect a positive correlation between equity 
capital and income because demand will increase with credit risk and investment.
(16)
3.2. Estimation Technique
Panel data regression was utilized to estimate the data in this study. There were many changes 
in the role of banking in Indonesia, among others, are changes in policy, bank closing, and 
merger and acquisitionafter the economic crisis. Therefore, we are dealing with unbalanced 
panel estimation. The use of panel estimation is to anticipate the possible correlation between 
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banks, for example when they share commonmarket target.
The method chosen or considered to be the most appropriate for this study is random 
effect method. This method was chosen with consideration of the number of samples more 
than the amount of time (Nachrowi and Usman, 2006). In addition, the choice is supportedwith 
the Haussman test (see Appendix). The fixed effect method cannot be used since provide a near 
singular matrix, due to many dummy variables, resulting matrix close to zero. 
Autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity examination was not carried out specifically since 
the amount of panel data in this study reach thousands. This minimizes the possible bias as 
when individual or company level data is aggregated. In addition to our effort to overcome 
multicollinearity and heteroschedasticity problem by using natural logarithm (de Rizas, 2007) 
and ratios, we also examine multicollinearity issue using coefficient covariance matrix.We 
examine the collinearity issue given that high collinearity can produce parameters that are not 
in accordance with the substance and potentially lead to miss interpretations, (Nachrowi and 
Usman, 2006). 
IV. RESULT AND ANALYSIS
Bank Stability
Broadly speaking, the estimation will provide us two types of statistics, namely E-Statistic 
forthe long-run equilibrium or indicator of stability, and H-Statistic that describes the level of 
competition for each bank group. Calculation of the level of competition with the PR method 
requires that the banking system must be in a long-run equilibrium. By applying the Wald test 
for the value of E-statistic, we know that during the consolidation period, overall banks were 
not in their long-run equilibrium.
When we estimate the E-statistic for each group of banks usingrandom effect models, 
we found that three of the six groups of commercial banks; state-owned banks, foreign 
banks, and non-foreign exchange banks, were not in their long-run equilibrium state during 
the consolidation period. The other three commercial banks, namely Regional Bank (BPD), 
joint venture banks, and foreign banks, were in long-run equilibrium situation during the 
consolidation period.
However, we still continue to measure the competition level using PR model for these three 
groups of bank that were not stable during consolidation period. Shaffer (2004) arguedthat if 
the result showed disequilibrium, it does not necessary reflect the PR model results to be invalid. 
Instead, rejection of equilibrium indicators showed that the banking industry was growing 
dynamically during the observation11. Shaffer (2008) also emphasized that research with this 
11 Quoted from Schaeck Klaus, Martin Cihak, and Simon Wolfe (2009), Competition, Concentration, and Bank Soundness: New 
Evidence from the Micro-Level 
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condition can still be continued as long as the H-statistics can reject a monopoly situation (H<0). 
If the H-statistic generates monopoly, then the long-term instability (E ≠ 0) would indicate that 
the market was in short-run equilibrium.
For the period of 2004-2006, the estimation result shows that the commercial banks were 
in their long-run equilibrium. The entire estimation results of E-statistic for each commercial 
banks group shows that the six banks were already in long-run equilibrium. This includes the 
state-owned banks, foreign exchange, and non-foreign exchange banks, which previously not 
in equilibriumduring consolidation phases.
The shift from non-equilibrium to equilibriumfor the entire group of banksshows that three 
years implementation of API had led stability for bank.Comparison between the two periods 
shows that more banks were stabilizing after the API luncheon (see Table 1). 
Indication of more stable commercial banks after the API luncheonwas also supported by 
several indicators. Deposits collections for all groups of commercial banks tended to rise, with 
the exception of the foreign bank deposits that slumped at the end of 2006. General bank 
lending continued to rise, as well as the Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR). In contrast, the percentage 
of bad loans at all commercial banks declined from 2001 to 2006, possibly due to the recovery 













Competition level of Commercial Banks
Calculation results for H-statistic value and the Wald test for each bank group is provided in 
Table 2. Overall, the commercial banks were in a monopolistic competition conditions during 
the consolidation period. Looking across bank group, four of the commercial banks were in 
monopoly or collusive oligopoly structure, while the other two groups (state-owned banks and 
foreign banks)were in monopolistic competition.
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Three years after the API was launched, competition in the Indonesian commercial banks 
has evolved.  A whole group of commercial banks were in a situation of monopoly or collusive 
oligopoly, where previously they were in monopolistic competition. This condition showed 
that the level of competition in commercial banks tended to be lower and higher monopoly 
intensities in some banks.
From 2001 to 2006, most of the banks were in a situation of monopoly or collusive 
oligopoly. In summary, banks weregenerally in a situation of monopoly or collusive oligopoly as 
supported by Manurung and Rahardja (2004) who stated that the financial industry is rarely in 
perfectly competitive market. This is particularly true for domestic market due to the difficulty 
for the new banks to achieve economies of scale, complexity management issues, and the 
severity of non-price competition.
Collusion in banking can be in a form of agreement, mutual assistance, and coordination 
between banks to set price and or non-price competition, (Alhadeff, 1951). Furthermore, the 
monopoly or oligopoly is more often favored by bankers because it produces more stable profits 
compared to the situationof a highly competitivemarket(Caves and Porter, 1978).
The findings of this study correct Setyowati(2004) and also the findings of Claessen and 
Laeven (2003) who concluded that Indonesian banks in general are in a situation of monopolistic 
competition. Along with the previous E-statistic result, we found that the competition in every 
group of commercial banks in Indonesia was getting lower with increasing stability. 
This finding is also supported by the results of H-statistics for all groups of commercial 
banks data, using only one dummy variable representing prior and after the implementation 
of API. The estimation results of six groups combined data shows a decrease in the level of 
competition, shifted from monopolistic competition towards monopoly or collusive oligopoly. 
Decrease in the level of competition as a result of increased stability in the financial sector is also 
supported by Allen and Gale (2004)12. Stability is beneficial for banks since it provides bigger 
opportunities to be a price leader. 
The first reason for the decline of competition level wasbecause of the large number of 
bank mergers and acquisitions, or consolidation among banks, especially in the following years 
after API luncheon (post crisis 1997/98). This policy was adopted because it was more elegant 
than direct liquidation, and would not likely triggering panic especially for banks with poor 
performance. Empirically, the process of mergers and acquisitions that reduce the number of 
banks was already pushing the market towards monopoly or oligopoly and away from perfect 
competition (Alhadeff, 1951; Bikker and Haaf, 2001).
12 Dimuat di dalam paper Berger, Denirguc-Kunt, dan Haubrich (2004). Bank Concentration and Competition: An Evolution in the 
Making. 
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The second factor that reduced the level of competition is the banking regulation, such as 
the Single Presence Policy13 (SPP), which encouraged reduction in the number of banks. Similarly, 
the establishment of new banks policy with minimum Rp 3 trillion of capital, also helped stop 
the emergence of new banks. At first, the presence of this regulation was to prevent fraud and 
mismanagement. However, in reality, these series of regulatory measures had also restricted 
the flexibilities of financial institutions (Manurung and Rahardja, 2004). 
Changes in the level of banking competition due to the emergence of a government policy 
or banking surveillance authority was also found in de Rozas (2007) research Spain banking 
and also in Bikker and Groeneveld (1998) on European banks after deregulation following the 
establishment of the European Union. Therefore, competition was likely hampered in a financial 
industry loaded with regulations.
Another interesting finding of the random effect estimationwas the presence of two out 
of six groups of banks that have a monopoly or collusive oligopoly structure, both prior and 
13 The SPP policy forced banks with common ultimate shareholders to merge into one bank. However, the definition of the common 
ultimate shareholders was apparently taken from legal lending limit, which was actually intended for spreading risk; this made the 
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after API luncheon. Two groups of banks are banks that have a niche market, the Regional Bank 
(BPD) group and joint venture banks. These findings indicate that the API does not affect the 
competitive level of these two groups of bank. Likewise, the foreign banks appeared to have 
the lowest competition level relative to other groups. Chances are this is related to the foreign 
bank presence in only certain cities due to the geographical limitationfor this bank.
On the micro level, the effect of competition changes on the asset side tends to be 
different from the liability side. On the liabilities side, the increase in competition may encourage 
an increase in deposit rate because banks tend to garner new customers through the lure of 
a higher interest rate relative to its competitors. In contrast,on the asset side, competition 
increase would drive banks to lower interest rates as banks try to offer lower interest rates to 
the debtor.
Panel data estimation results showed that not all elasticity parameters of independent 
variable are statistically significant. These insignificant variables could be interpreted to represent 
the evolution of the market structure and market specialization process. Some variables which 
are likely to be decisive in the future of competition level are the number of branches, the price 
of labor, and the volume of lending14. 
The number of branches could affect the level of competition and bank profits15. Branches 
could increase profits at the point where bank branches are able to spearhead marketing, 
both in terms of financial resources (adding depositors) and the use of funds (increase the 
debtor) leading to an increase in transactions. In contrast, the branch office that is not able to 
attract more customers will add costs. It is evident for example on BRI with its Terasprogram, 
the BTPN with MUR, Danamon with DSP, Bukopin with Swa Mitra, and even Mandiri with its 
Micro Unit.
The price and the quantity of labor could also be determinant of competition in the future 
given the direct relationship between the price of labor and the costs. Decline in the price of 
labor will also decrease the cost, considering the banking industry as a labor intensive industry, 
particularly for banks that engaged in retail or micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).
The volume of lending could also be a determinant of competition (in terms of assets to 
the bank) since banklending will create revenue through interest margin, which is much larger 
than the inter-bank money or securities market. More bank lending will invite greater income, 
14 De Guavara, Maudos, and Perez (2002) which researched levels of competition with a model that was almost the same as the PR 
model but it was based on a function of cost and price of three factors of production in its processing to produce a findings that 
contained a lot slope for the independent variables which were not significant.
15 Branches are not limited to the physical form of the building but also the non-physical (or often called branchless banking) such 
as internet banking or e-banking which is growing along with information and communication technology and more innovative 
gadgets. In addition, the bank is also working with the post office or agency, finance companies, rural banks and Credit Unions to 
expand its network, such as Danamon with DSP, etc. Bukopin with Swa Partners.
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and vice versa. It is worth to note that the Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR) during the banking 
consolidation period was lower than after the API luncheon. This represents potential increase 
of credit allocation.
V. CONCLUSION
The first conclusion of this paper is that the overall performance of the commercial banks 
improved after three years the API luncheon. All groups of commercial banks were also more 
stable after the API. Although more stable, competition level of banking industry in Indonesia 
at the national level tended to decrease. Commercial banks in general were in monopolistic 
competition during the period of consolidation and then shifted to monopoly or collusive 
oligopoly after API.
Across the banking group, the market structure of commercial and foreign exchange 
bank were previously monopolistic competition during consolidation period, and then shifted 
to monopoly or collusive oligopoly after the API. On the other hand, those bank with originally 
in monopoly or collusive oligopoly also experienced a decline in competition level (or increasing 
monopoly intensities).
We suspect the decline of banking competition level is caused by reduction of number 
of banks, and also by the emergence of banking deregulation. In addition, the declineof 
competition level was also affected by the increase of banking stability. Therefore, this study 
provides evidence that commercial banks became more stable, with lower levels of competition 
after the API luncheon.
The second conclusion, the API does not affect the structure of competition in the 
Regional Bank (BPD) group that has a niche market (i.e. local governments, their employees and 
associated companies), nor the joint venture banks with a fixed market of foreign multinational 
companies. The monopolistic competition or collusive oligopoly on these two types of banks 
stayed the same prior and post the implementation of API.
The third conclusion is that foreign banks have a lower level of competition relative to 
other bank groups. This is related to the regional restriction imposed by the government to 
operate only in certain region. 
To investigate in more detail about the structure of banking industry in Indonesia, future 
study can release the static assumption as presumed on current paper. Another option is to use 
more precise proxy for the variables. The grouping of the bank based on their asset size may 
also be interesting rather than use the current classification from Bank Indonesia. 
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This paper has emphasized the future decisive role of number of branch, price of labor, 
and the credit volume (across region) on the level of bank competition. Future research may 
want to focus on these variables to predict and to manage the competition of banking to the 
desired level.  
The above findings bring implications for the monetary authorities to pay more attention on 
the level of competition among banks, considering that the larger tendency toward monopoly, 
the greater inefficiency will occur. With respect to the ability to compete globally, it is also 
important for the bank to achieve certain scale, be strong and stable, which could be attained 
by merger and acquisition process, without sacrifice the decline in competition level. 
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APPENDIX
Wald Test for Statistic - E (E=0) 
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Wald Test for restriction H=0 and H=1 
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